Article 10 ECHR and expressive conduct by Ó Fathaigh, Rónán & Voorhoof, Dirk
 1 
 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh∗ and Dirk Voorhoof∗∗ 
Article 10 ECHR and Expressive Conduct 
In: 
Communications Law, The Journal of Computer, Media en Telecommunications Law 
2019/2, Vol 24, 62-73 (Bloomsburry Professional, Oxford) 
 
Introduction  
 
In early 2018, Judge Ganna Yudkivska, President of the Fourth Section of the European Court 
of Human Rights, and judge elected in respect of Ukraine, joined a respectful, but strongly-
worded dissenting opinion, criticising the majority’s judgment in Sinkova v Ukraine.1 The 
Court in Sinkova, by a majority of four votes to three, found that an activist’s conviction, 
including a suspended three-year prison sentence, for staging a performance-art protest at a war 
memorial in central Kiev, did not violate the activist’s freedom of expression under Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.2 The dissenting opinion ominously warned that 
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the majority’s judgment gave rise to a ‘real risk of eroding the right of individuals to voice their 
opinions and protest through peaceful, albeit controversial, means’, pointing to ‘inconsistency’ 
with the Court’s case law, and a disregard for the principle that criminal penalties are likely to 
have a ‘chilling effect on satirical forms of expression relating to topical issues’.3 
The finding of no violation of Article 10 by the Sinkova majority does indeed stand out, 
given that in the subsequent 12 months alone, the Court has delivered a series of judgments 
finding violations of Article 10 over convictions for engaging in expressive conduct, including: 
activists burning an effigy of the Spanish King,4 Pussy Riot performing from the altar of a 
Moscow cathedral,5 and an activist erecting large wooden genitalia outside a prosecutor’s 
office.6 The purpose of this article is to discuss the Court’s recent case law on expressive 
conduct under Article 10, and in particular to assess in what circumstances, if any, domestic 
courts may impose prison sentences, even if suspended, on activists engaging in peaceful, but 
provocative and offensive expression. 
Mead has noted that historically, the European Court only afforded ‘limited protection’ 
to ‘direct action or any form of protest that causes more than merely incidental obstruction’.7 
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Similarly, the international human rights organisation Article 19 has also noted that the 
international and regional jurisprudence on peaceful direct action is ‘limited’.8 And yet, we live 
in an ‘age of protest’,9 and as Clooney and Webb have commented, many governments are 
using public order laws, such as hooliganism laws, to criminalise expression ‘that is insulting 
to the ruling authorities’.10 Indeed, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association recently reported that in several European countries, there is 
‘politically motivated repression of activists’,11 ‘repression of peaceful protestors in the context 
of occupation’,12 and the use of ‘public order laws to suppress freedom of peaceful assembly’.13 
This was also echoed in the 2019 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion 
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or belief, that public order laws were being used to ‘restrict the freedom to express views 
deemed offensive to religious or belief communities’.14  
In contrast, there has been considerable case law and scholarship in the US on 
expressive conduct under the First Amendment,15 where the Supreme Court has recognised a 
‘wide array of conduct that can qualify as expressive’, including burning the American flag, 
wearing a military uniform, wearing a black armband, conducting a silent sit-in, and refusing 
to salute the American flag.16 In the case of Snyder v Phelps et al, the Supreme Court found 
that peaceful picketing near a military funeral with signs strongly opposing homosexuality was 
protected under the First Amendment, although the conduct of the protesters and the content 
of their signs was considered as being hurtful, outrageous and inflicting emotional distress 
amongst the participants of the funeral and the family of the deceased soldier.17 The Supreme 
Court reiterated that ‘[s]peech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of 
both joy and sorrow, and - as it did here - inflict great pain’, but ‘[a]s a Nation we have chosen 
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a different course - to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not 
stifle public debate’.18 
 This article will analyse how the European Court of Human Rights, has recently19   been 
confronting similar issues, and how it is developing its expressive conduct jurisprudence under 
the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR.    
 
Division within the Court’s Fourth Section: Sinkova v Ukraine  
 
We begin our discussion of expressive conduct with the Fourth Section’s judgment in 
Sinkova,20 which involved Anna Olegovna Sinkova, who was a member of the Kiev-based 
artistic group St. Luke Brotherhood.21 In December 2010, Sinkova and three other group 
members decided to protest ‘against wasteful use of natural gas by the State while turning a 
blind eye to poor living standards of veterans’,22 and staged an artistic performance at a war 
memorial in central Kyiv. The performance involved Sinkova frying eggs over the Eternal 
Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and a member of the group filmed the 
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performance. Two police officers had approached the group and remarked that their behaviour 
was ‘inappropriate’, but they made no further interference.23 
Sinkova posted the video of her performance online as an act of protest, with the 
commentary that ‘precious natural gas has been being burned, pointlessly, at the Glory 
Memorial in Kyiv for fifty-three years now. This pleasure costs taxpayers about 300,000 
hryvnias per month’.24 Following the video’s publication, a number of complaints were made 
to the police. In late March 2011, Sinkova was arrested, and charged with ‘desecration of the 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier’, which is an offence under Article 297 of Ukraine’s Criminal 
Code.25 The District Court granted a request for Sinkova’s pre-trial detention, as she was 
accused of a ‘serious offence punishable by imprisonment from three to five years’.26 
Following three months in pre-trial detention, Sinkova was convicted of the offence. 
The District Court held that Sinkova’s argument that her performance had not been meant to 
desecrate the tomb ‘had no impact on the legal classification of her actions’, and the ‘deliberate 
acts’ showed ‘disrespect for the burial place of the Unknown Soldier’.27 The District Court 
imposed a three-year prison sentence, which was suspended for two years. The conviction was 
upheld on appeal, with the Kyiv City Court of Appeal rejecting Sinkova’s argument that there 
had been a violation of her right to freedom of expression, ruling that her conviction was ‘in 
accordance with the law and pursued a legitimate aim’.28 
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Sinkova subsequently made an application to the European Court, claiming her pre-trial 
detention had violated her right to liberty under Article 5, and her conviction had violated her 
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. On Article 5, the Fourth Section 
unanimously found three separate violations concerning her pre-trial detention.29 However, on 
Article 10, the Fourth Section, divided four votes to three, finding that there had been no 
violation of Sinkova’s freedom of expression. 
The majority judgment noted that the interference with Sinkova’s Article 10 right to 
freedom of expression was based on the sufficiently precise criminal code provision on 
‘desecration’, and that the conviction pursued the legitimate aim of ‘protecting morals and the 
rights of others’.30 The main question was whether the conviction had been necessary in a 
democratic society. The majority held that Sinkova was prosecuted and convicted ‘only’ on 
account of frying eggs over the Eternal Flame.31 The majority pointed out that she had not been 
charged over the video, nor the content of the ‘rather sarcastic and provocative text’ in the 
video.32 Thus, the applicant was not convicted for ‘expressing the views that she did’, but rather 
her conviction ‘was a narrow one in respect of particular conduct in a particular place’, and 
based on a ‘general prohibition of contempt for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier forming part 
of ordinary criminal law’.33 
Although the Court admitted that the domestic courts ‘paid little attention to the 
applicant’s stated motives given their irrelevance for the legal classification of her actions’, it 
noted that the courts ‘did take into account the applicant’s individual circumstances in deciding 
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on her sentence’.34 The majority rejected Sinkova’s argument that her conduct could not be 
reasonably interpreted as contemptuous towards those the memorial honoured, with the Court 
noting that ‘eternal flames are a long-standing tradition in many cultures and religions most 
often aimed at commemorating a person or event of national significance’.35 The majority held 
that there were many ‘suitable’ opportunities for Sinkova to express her views, or participate 
in ‘genuine’ protests, without breaking the criminal law, and without ‘insulting the memory of 
soldiers who perished and the feelings of veterans’.36  
Finally, the majority examined the nature and severity of the penalty, and noted the 
conclusion in Murat Vural v Turkey, that ‘peaceful and non-violent forms of expression in 
principle should not be made subject to the threat of a custodial sentence’.37 However, the 
majority observed that in contrast to Murat Vural, where the applicant was imprisoned for over 
13 years, Sinkova was ‘given a suspended sentence and did not serve a single day of it’.38 The 
majority thus held there had been no violation of Article 10.  
Notably, three judges dissented. The dissent found a violation of Article 10, including 
the domestic courts’ failure to address the ‘purpose of the applicant’s performance’, and the 
disregard of the performance’s satirical nature.39 The dissent also referred to the established 
principle in the Court’s case law that freedom of expression ‘is applicable not only to 
‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter 
of indifference, but also to those that ‘offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
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population’.40 Further, the dissent noted an ‘inconsistency’ in the majority’s position and the 
Court’s prior case law that a suspended prison sentence is ‘likely to have a chilling effect on 
satirical forms of expression’.41 Given ‘the lack of adequate assessment by the national 
authorities of the applicant’s performance from the standpoint of Article 10 of the Convention’, 
and the ‘complete disregard of its satirical nature’, in addition to the ‘disproportionate nature 
of the sentence’, the dissenting judges found that Article 10 was violated in the present case.42 
It must be reiterated at the outset that the Fourth Section unanimously found three 
separate violations of Article 5 over Sinkova’s three-month detention before trial. However, 
this should not take away from the serious questions that arguably lie over the majority’s 
conclusion that the prosecution, conviction and sentence did not violate Article 10. The first 
point concerns the majority’s finding that Sinkova ‘was not convicted for expressing the views 
that she did’, nor for the ‘distribution by her of the respective video’, but was convicted ‘only’ 
on account of frying eggs over the memorial flame.43 However, this idea of completely 
stripping the performance of all meaning and context does not seem consistent with the Court’s 
case law. On this point, and most curiously, the majority fails to apply, or even cite, the 
unanimous 2012 judgment in Tatár and Fáber v Hungary, which is arguably directly relevant, 
and similarly concerned a ‘provocative performance’.44  
In Tatár and Fáber, two protestors had been prosecuted for a regulatory offence for 
hanging dirty laundry on the fence of the Hungarian parliament, as a protest ‘to hang out the 
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nation’s dirty laundry’.45 Notably, the Court in Tatár and Fáber rejected the government’s 
argument that that the protestors had ‘not been’ sanctioned for ‘expressing their political 
views’,46 but only for ‘failure to respect’ a notification rule.47 The Court held that the 
performance was a form of ‘artistic and political expression’.48 Restrictions on such speech are 
subject to the Court’s highest scrutiny, and must be ‘convincingly established’.49 Similar to the 
protest in Sinkova, the Court in Tatár and Fáber found it crucial that the ‘political performance’ 
in question was ‘intended to send a message through the media’.50 The Court unanimously 
found a violation of Article 10, concluding that even an administrative sanction, ‘however 
mild’, on the authors of such artistic and political expressions, can have ‘an undesirable chilling 
effect on public speech’.51  
It is difficult to see how the Sinkova majority’s findings square with Tatár and Fáber, 
given that the performance was similarly artistic and political expression, concerned a matter 
of public interest, with the performance filmed to send a message through online media. Rather 
than apply Tatár and Fáber, and other relevant judgments,52 the Sinkova majority curiously 
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relied upon a single admissibility decision, namely Maguire v UK, as its sole authority.53 
However, it is quite difficult to see how the decision in Maguire is applicable, given that its 
facts are arguably so far removed from Sinkova, concerning an arrest for displaying the initials 
of a terrorist organisation on a sweater at a football match prone to ‘sectarian violence’.54 
Crucially, the Court in Maguire accepted that the sweater was likely ‘to give rise to a substantial 
risk of violence’,55 and the purpose of the prosecution was the ‘prevention of disorder and 
crime’.56 In contrast, there was no risk of public disorder in Sinkova, the police officers had not 
considered it necessary to interfere with the protest beyond a ‘remark’,57 and the purpose of the 
prosecution had been the ‘protecting morals and the rights of others’.58 
The second point relates to the majority’s finding that it was acceptable under Article 
10 that ‘the domestic courts paid little attention to the applicant’s stated motives given their 
+irrelevance for the legal classification of her actions’.59 However, it is highly questionable 
that such disregard for Sinkova’s intention is consistent with the Court’s case law. Indeed, on 
several occasions when finding a violation of Article 10, the Court explicitly took into 
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consideration the intention of the applicant, rather than the mere fact of the criminal offence.60 
Thus, in Tatár and Fáber the Court took into account that the political performance ‘was 
intended to send a message’.61 The Court was even more explicit in Murat Vural v Turkey, 
holding that ‘in light of its case-law’, assessment ‘must be made’ of the ‘purpose or the 
intention of the person performing the act or carrying out the conduct in question’.62  
Further, the majority’s framing of the issue that Sinkova broke ‘the criminal law’, leads 
in a problematic way to the justification of the interference with her freedom of expression 
rights under Article 10. In Tatár and Fáber, the Court reiterated that the performance’s 
‘classification in national law has only relative value and constitutes no more than a starting-
point’.63 It is indeed up to the government to ‘convincingly establish’ the necessity for 
interfering with freedom of expression, and not simply point to a law, with the scrutiny ending 
there. The Court needs to assess the legitimate aim behind the prosecution, which in Sinkova 
was ‘protecting morals’, and more particularly, protecting against ‘insulting the memory of 
soldiers’ and the ‘feelings of veterans’.64 However, it is highly questionable that the aim of 
protecting the memory of soldiers from insult, and the feelings of veterans, outweighs 
Sinkova’s freedom of expression, given that it (a) was a ‘political and artistic performance’, 
subject to the highest protection of Article 10, (b) concerned a matter of public interest 
(‘wasteful use of natural gas’ and ‘poor living standards of veterans’),65 (c) did not involve 
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violence, and (d) had no intention to insult or hurt. On this latter point, the Grand Chamber in 
Perinçek v Switzerland, concerning insult to the memory of Armenians, held that the applicant 
‘did not express contempt or hatred for the victims’, and did not use ‘abusive terms’.66 In other 
cases, such as Alekseyev v Russia, and Sergey Kuznetsov v Russia, the Court found that any 
measures interfering with the freedom of assembly and expression ‘other than in cases of 
incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles - however shocking and 
unacceptable certain views or words may appear to the authorities - do a disservice to 
democracy and often even endanger it’.67  
Another point of concern relates to the majority’s holding that ‘there were many 
suitable opportunities for the applicant to express her views or participate in genuine protests’, 
without ‘breaking the criminal law’, and ‘insulting the memory of soldiers’ and ‘feelings of 
veterans’.68 However, this approach arguably turns the logic of Article 10 upside down and 
reverses the burden of proof: it is not up to the individual to show that breaching the law was 
necessary, it is up to the State to justify that applying the criminal law was necessary in a 
democratic society. Considering that there were other means of expression available is no valid 
argument to end Article 10 scrutiny. As a matter of fact, there are always other forms or 
channels available to express an opinion or formulate a criticism. No authority was offered for 
this limiting principle by the Sinkova majority, and arguably offends the Court’s seminal 
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principle that Article 10 protects ‘not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed 
but also the form in which they were conveyed’.69 Indeed, in Women on Waves and Others v 
Portugal, the Court held that for ‘symbolic protests’, the ‘mode of dissemination’ is of ‘such 
importance’ that restrictions may ‘substantially affect the substance of the ideas and 
information in question’.70 
Finally, the majority distinguish the principle from Murat Vural that ‘peaceful and non-
violent forms of expression in principle should not be made subject to the threat of a custodial 
sentence’, because the applicant in Sinkova was only given a suspended sentence and ‘did not 
serve a single day of it’.71 However, Murat Vural was only applying an earlier principle, which 
had been established in two earlier cases of Pekaslan and Others v Turkey, and Yılmaz Yıldız 
and Others v Turkey, where it was held that a peaceful demonstration should not, in principle, 
be made subject to the threat of a ‘penal sanction’.72 Notably, in Pekaslan the protestors were 
prosecuted, and ‘subsequently acquitted’,73 while in Yılmaz Yıldız the protestors only received 
‘administrative fines’.74 Moreover, in Akgöl and Göl v Turkey, the Court found that a suspended 
15-month prison sentence violated Article 10, as a peaceful demonstration should not, in 
principle, be made subject to the threat of a ‘penal sanction’.75 Thus, on the basis of Pekaslan, 
Yılmaz Yıldız, and Akgöl and Göl, it is difficult to see how the suspended three-year prison 
sentence in Sinkova is consistent with Article 10. Finally, the majority seems to completely 
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neglect the fact the Sinkova spent three months in pre-trial detention, while in Taranenko v 
Russia, the Court, in considering a suspended three-year prison sentence, also took into account 
the ‘period of detention pending trial’ in finding a violation of Article 10.76 The emphasis by 
the majority that Sinkova ‘did not serve a single day’ of the suspended prison sentence,  
disregards the fact that she spent effectively three months in prison.  
 
Third Section takes a different path on expressive conduct  
 
Two weeks after Sinkova, a different Section of the Court, the Third Section, delivered its own 
judgment on expressive conduct, and took a markedly different approach. The case was Stern 
Taulats and Roura Capellera v Spain,77 and arose when the two applicants set fire to a large 
photograph of the Spanish royal couple, turned upside down, in Girona’s public square on the 
occasion of the Spanish King’s visit to the city in September 2007. The applicants were 
subsequently prosecuted under Article 490 of Spain’s Criminal Code for ‘insulting the 
Crown’.78 Nearly a year later, the applicants were convicted, and each received a 15-month 
prison sentence, which were conditionally suspended on payment of 2,700-euro fines. The 
convictions were upheld by Spain’s Constitutional Court, finding that the ‘symbolic act’ was 
not covered by freedom of expression, and burning a person’s photograph in such a manner, 
‘entails incitement to violence against the person and the institution he or she represents, 
encourages feelings of aggression against the person and expresses a threat’.79  
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  The applicants made an application to the European Court over their convictions, and 
in March 2018, the Court’s Third Section unanimously found a violation of Article 10. The 
Court rejected the domestic courts’ view that the act was not covered by freedom of expression, 
with the Court instead holding that the ‘staged event’ was a form of political expression fully 
protected by Article 10, consisting of ‘symbolic expression’ on a matter of public interest, 
namely the institution of the monarchy.80 The Court reiterated that there is ‘little scope’ under 
Article 10 for restrictions on such political expression, and any restriction must be ‘established 
convincingly’.81 The Court noted that the act was a ‘provocative’ event, staged to attract media 
attention, and ‘merely used a certain permissible degree of provocation’ to ‘transmit a critical 
message’ in the context of freedom of expression.82  
 The Court reviewed the domestic courts’ reasoning, with the Court unanimously 
rejecting the domestic courts’ view that the expressive conduct could be regarded as incitement 
to hatred or violence. The Court emphasised that there was no evidence of violent conduct or 
disturbances to public order,83 there had been no intention on the part of the applicants to incite 
anyone to commit acts of violence against the King, and it was ‘clear and obvious’ that the 
conduct was ‘symbolic expression of dissatisfaction and protest’ on a matter of public 
interest.84 Finally, the Court examined the criminal penalty imposed, noting that it consisted of 
the ‘imposition of a term of imprisonment to be enforced in the event of non-payment of the 
fine’.85 The Court applied the principle that prison sentences for an ‘offence in the area of 
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political speech’ will be compatible with Article 10 only in ‘exceptional circumstances’, such 
as for hate speech or incitement to violence.86 But no such circumstances existed here, and the 
Court unanimously held that interference with freedom of expression was not ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’, and therefore in violation of Article 10.87 
 Thus, in contrast to Sinkova, the Third Section in Stern Taulats took into account (a) 
the purpose of the expressive conduct, classifying it as political expression on a matter of public 
interest, and subject to the Court’s highest standard of scrutiny; (b) the applicants’ intention 
not to provoke violence or hatred; and (c) its staging to attract media attention and transmit a 
message. The Third Section also paid little heed to the prison sentence being suspended, and 
applied the Court’s case law that prison sentences, even if suspended, are rarely justifiable for 
political expression. Crucially, the Third Section nowhere mentioned, nor even cited, the 
Sinkova judgment. 
At this point, it must be noted that the applicant in Sinkova had requested that the case 
be referred to the Court’s 17-judge Grand Chamber; and given the dissenting opinion’s 
warning, the request was supported by over 22 organisations involved in free expression and 
peaceful assembly.88 However, a five-judge Panel of the Grand Chamber rejected the request 
in early July 2018.89 But this was not the end of the story, as two weeks later in mid-July 2018, 
the Third Section would again deliver another judgment on expressive conduct, involving the 
internationally-known protest group Pussy Riot.  
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The case was Mariya Alekhina and Others v Russia,90 where the three applicants were 
members of Pussy Riot, and concerned their convictions and imprisonment for attempting to 
perform one of their protest songs (‘Punk Prayer – Virgin Mary, Drive Putin Away’) in a 
Moscow cathedral in January 2012. The performance in the cathedral was meant to express 
disapproval of the political situation in Russia at the time and of Patriarch Kirill, leader of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, who had strongly criticised the large-scale street protests across the 
country against the recently held parliamentary elections and the approaching presidential 
election. No service was taking place, but some people were inside the cathedral, including 
journalists invited by the band for publicity. The performance only lasted slightly over a 
minute, as cathedral guards quickly forced the band out. The band uploaded the video footage 
of their attempted performance to their website and to YouTube.  
The three applicants were arrested shortly after the performance for ‘hooliganism 
motivated by religious hatred’,91 and were held in custody and pre-trial detention for just over 
five months, before being convicted as charged. The trial court found that Pussy Riot’s actions 
had been offensive and insulting, referring to their ‘brightly coloured clothes’ and balaclavas, 
and ‘brusque movements with their heads, arms and legs, accompanying them with obscene 
language’.92 The court rejected Pussy Riot’s arguments that their performance had been 
politically and not religiously motivated; and they were sentenced to one year and eleven 
months imprisonment for hooliganism motivated by religious hatred and enmity, committed in 
a group acting with premeditation and in concert, under Article 213 § 2 of the Criminal Code.93 
All appeals against this decision failed. The domestic courts also ruled that the performance 
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had been offensive and banned access to the ‘extremist’ video recordings Pussy Riot had 
subsequently uploaded onto the Internet.94 The first and second applicants served 
approximately one year and nine months in prison before being amnestied, while the third 
applicant served approximately seven months imprisonment before her sentence was 
suspended. 
The applicants made an application to the European Court over various aspects of their 
arrest, pre-trial detention, and the conduct of the trial, with the Court’s Third Section 
unanimously finding violations of Article 3, Article 5 and Article 6. For present purposes, the 
focus is on the Third Section finding a violation of Article 10 over the applicants’ convictions.95  
The Court first addressed whether the applicants’ conduct in the cathedral was protected 
by Article 10.  The Court reiterated that opinions or artistic works, apart from being capable of 
being expressed through the media, can also be ‘expressed through conduct’.96 The Court 
pointed to Tatár and Fáber, where the public display of several items of dirty clothing near the 
Hungarian Parliament, representing the ‘dirty laundry of the nation’, had been qualified as a 
form of protected political expression,97 and Murat Vural, where pouring paint on statues of 
Ataturk has been considered as an expressive act performed as a protest against the Turkish 
political regime.98 In the present case, the Court considered that the applicants had attempted 
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to perform their song as a ‘response to the ongoing political process in Russia’, and invited 
journalists and the media to the performance to gain publicity.99 The Court held that such action 
constituted a ‘mix of conduct and verbal expression’ and amounted to a form of ‘artistic and 
political expression’ covered by Article 10.100 
The main question for the Court was then whether the interference with freedom of 
expression had been necessary in a democratic society. The Court first emphasised that the 
applicants’ actions ‘contributed to the debate about the political situation in Russia and the 
exercise of parliamentary and presidential powers’.101 The Court reiterated that there is little 
scope under Article 10 for restrictions on political speech or debates on questions of public 
interest, and very strong reasons are required for justifying such restrictions.102  
The Court then reviewed the domestic courts’ reasoning, and first noted that the 
applicants were convicted of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred ‘on account of the 
clothes and balaclavas they wore, their bodily movements and strong language’.103 The Court 
admitted that as the conduct took place in a cathedral, it ‘could have been found offensive by 
a number of people, which might include churchgoers’.104 However, the Court held that it was 
unable to discern ‘any element’ in the Russian courts’ analysis which would allow a description 
of the applicants’ conduct as incitement to religious hatred, including (a) no examination of 
whether the actions could be interpreted as a call for violence or as a justification of violence, 
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hatred or intolerance, (b) no analysis of the context of the performance, and (c) no examination 
of whether the conduct could have led to harmful consequences. 105  
In contrast, the European Court held that the performance (a) did not contain any 
elements of violence; (b) did not stir up or justify violence, hatred or intolerance of believers;106 
(c) did not disrupt any religious services, and (d) did not cause any injures to people inside the 
cathedral or any damage to church property.107 The Court then turned to the sanctions imposed, 
noting the ‘exceptional seriousness’ of the sanctions.108 Importantly, the Court reiterated that 
‘in principle’ peaceful forms of expression should not be made subject to the threat of 
imposition of a custodial sentence, as criminal sanctions may have a ‘chilling effect’ on the 
exercise of freedom of expression.109 Applying this principle, the Court held that ‘certain 
reactions’ to the applicants’ actions ‘might have been warranted’ on account of the breach of 
the rules of conduct in a religious institution; however, the domestic courts failed to adduce 
‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons to justify the criminal conviction and prison sentence imposed 
on the applicants.110 The Court concluded that the interference with freedom of expression was 
not necessary in a democratic society, and thus in violation of Article 10.111 
 The Third Section in Mariya Alekhina continued its approach from Stern Taulats of 
having regard to (a) the purpose of the expressive conduct, classifying it as ‘artistic and political 
expression’, and subject to the Court’s highest standard of scrutiny; and (b) the applicants’ 
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intention not to provoke violence or hatred; but rather wishing to contribute to the public debate 
on ‘topics of public interest’. Most importantly, the Third Section in Mariya Alekhina 
confirmed that under ‘international standards for the protection of freedom of expression,’ 
restrictions in the form of criminal sanctions on non-violent expression ‘are only acceptable in 
cases of incitement to hatred’.112 The Third Section reiterated that, ‘in principle’, ‘peaceful and 
non-violent forms of expression should not be made subject to the threat of imposition of a 
custodial sentence’.113 And again, the Third Section nowhere mentioned, nor even cited, the 
Sinkova judgment; and instead applied the Court’s earlier case law on the right to peaceful 
protest.114 
 
Second Section further questions Sinkova in Mătăsaru v the Republic of Moldova 
 
Both Stern Taulats and Mariya Alekhina omitted any mention of Sinkova, and further question 
marks over Sinkova arose again in early 2019 when the Court’s Second Section also considered 
a conviction for expressive conduct in the form of an ‘obscene’ demonstration outside a 
Moldovan prosecutor’s office. And similar to the Third Section, the Second Section would 
choose not to follow, nor even cite, Sinkova.  
The case was Mătăsaru v the Republic of Moldova,115 where the applicant was Anatol 
Mătăsaru, a 49-year-old resident of the Moldovan capital Chișinău. The case began in late 
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January 2013, when Mătăsaru demonstrated outside the Prosecutor General’s Office in 
Chișinău to protest against the ‘corruption and the control exercised by politicians over the 
Prosecutor General’s Office’. The protest involved erecting two large wooden sculptures on 
the stairs of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the first being a large penis with a picture of a 
public official attached to its head; while the second was a large vulva with pictures of several 
officials from the prosecutor’s office in the middle. The protest lasted an hour before police 
officers intervened, arresting Mătăsaru and seizing the sculptures. 
Mătăsaru was charged with hooliganism under Article 287 of the Moldovan Criminal 
Code, defined as ‘deliberate actions grossly violating public order, involving violence or threats 
of violence or resistance to authorities’ representatives or to other persons who suppress such 
actions as well as actions that by their content are distinguished by an excessive cynicism or 
impudence’.116 Two years later, Mătăsaru was convicted of hooliganism by the Râșcani District 
Court, and received a two-year prison sentence, suspended for three years. The District Court 
held that Mătăsaru’s actions had been ‘immoral’ and exposed ‘obscene’ sculptures in a public 
place where ‘they could be seen by anyone, including by children’.117 The District Court also 
held ‘assimilating public officials with genitals went beyond the acceptable limits of criticism’, 
and was ‘not an act protected under Article 10 [ECHR]’.118 Mătăsaru’s conviction and sentence 
were upheld by both the Chișinău Court of Appeal and Moldova’s Supreme Court of Justice. 
Mătăsaru made an application to the European Court, claiming his conviction was a 
violation of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10. He submitted that his 
conviction was not ‘prescribed by law’, arguing the Criminal Code’s Article 287 on the offence 
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of hooliganism was ‘not applicable to the particular circumstances of his case’.119 However, 
the Court, while noting the Moldovan courts had ‘failed to explain in a satisfactory manner 
why they opted for the criminal sanction provided for by Article 287’, held it was ‘unnecessary’ 
to decide the issue given the Court’s later findings.120 Thus, the main question for the European 
Court was whether the conviction had been necessary in a democratic society.  
The Court first reiterated that Article 10 protects opinions ‘expressed through conduct’, 
including expressive conduct which offends, shocks or disturbs the State or ‘any section of the 
population’.121  It referred to its previous case law on expressive conduct where it had found: 
displaying dirty laundry near the Hungarian parliament was a form of ‘political expression’;122 
pouring paint on statues of Atatürk was an ‘expressive act’ performed as a protest against the 
political regime;123 detaching a ribbon from a wreath laid by the Ukrainian President at a 
monument was a form of ‘political expression’;124 and the Pussy Riot punk band attempting to 
perform from the altar of a Moscow cathedral was a form of ‘artistic and political 
expression’.125  
The Court then examined Mătăsaru’s protest, and noted that he had been found guilty 
of hooliganism because during his protest he had exposed public sculptures of an obscene 
nature and because he had attached to them pictures of a politician and several senior 
prosecutors, thus ‘offending [the politician and senior prosecutors] and infringing their right to 
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dignity’.126 Applying its Article 10 principles, the Court held that it ‘cannot agree’ with the 
Moldovan courts’ ruling that Article 10 was ‘inapplicable to the applicant’s conduct’.127 The 
Court noted that the Moldovan courts did not conduct a ‘proper balancing exercise’ under 
Article 10 of the different interests involved, and imposed a ‘very heavy sanction’ on the 
applicant in the form of a suspended prison sentence.128 The Court then applied its unanimous 
Grand Chamber judgment in Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania, holding that the circumstances 
of Mătăsaru’s protest ‘present no justification whatsoever for the imposition of a prison 
sentence’.129 This was because a prison sentence, even if suspended, by its very nature, not 
only has negative repercussions on the applicant, but may also have a ‘serious chilling effect’ 
on other persons and discourage them from exercising their freedom of expression.130  
The Court concluded that although the interference with freedom of expression ‘may 
have been justified by the concern to restore the balance between the various competing 
interests at stake’, the criminal sanction imposed was ‘manifestly disproportionate in its nature 
and severity to the legitimate aim pursued by the domestic authorities’.131 Thus, the Court 
unanimously held that the Moldovan courts went beyond what would have amounted to a 
‘necessary’ restriction on the applicant’s freedom of expression, therefore in violation of 
Article 10.132  
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The unanimous judgment in Mătăsaru is a strong reaffirmation that domestic courts 
may not impose prison sentences, even if suspended, on peaceful protestors engaging in 
expressive conduct (including artistic and satirical expression) on matters of public interest. 
The Court was categorical on this point, holding that there was no justification whatsoever for 
a suspended prison sentence. This amplifies the Court’s case law that a peaceful demonstration 
should not, ‘in principle’, be made subject to the ‘threat of a penal sanction’.133  
Of note, the Court in Mătăsaru nowhere mentioned, nor even cited, the Sinkova 
judgment. Indeed, Sinkova has not been applied in a Court judgment to date, and the Mătăsaru 
judgment suggests Sinkova is becoming a disapproved and lone aberration in the case law on 
the imposition of suspended prison sentences for peaceful protest and participation in matters 
of public debate. Further, the Court in Mătăsaru nowhere adopted the type of reasoning evident 
in Sinkova of emphasising the ‘many suitable opportunities for the applicant to express her 
views or participate in genuine protests’, without ‘breaking the criminal law’. 134 As mentioned 
earlier, this type of reasoning turns Article 10 upside down, and could easily have been applied 
in Mătăsaru by emphasising the many other suitable opportunities for the applicant to express 
his views without breaking the criminal law and engaging in obscene expression. But correctly, 
the Court did not adopt such reasoning for justifying the interference complained of.   
While Mătăsaru is a welcome judgment, one point needs to be teased out relating to 
the Court’s statement in the second-last paragraph: that the interference with freedom of 
expression ‘may have been justified by the concern to restore the balance between the various 
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competing interests at stake’.135 The Court seemed to be leaving open the suggestion that there 
existed certain interests which outweighed the applicant’s freedom of expression. But while 
the Court did not explore the point fully, a brief mention of the relevant case law would have 
been relevant and informative. 
The Court has already dealt with the distinct issue of public officials seeking to prohibit 
their depiction in an ‘obscene’ manner. The leading judgment is Vereinigung Bildender 
Künstler v Austria, concerning an injunction preventing further depiction of a politician where 
a photo of his face was placed on a painted naked body, ‘gripping the ejaculating penis’ of 
another public official, while ‘being touched by two other’ public officials and ‘ejaculating on 
Mother Teresa’.136 The Court found a violation of Article 10, as the politician’s ‘personal 
interests’ did not outweigh the right to engage in satirical expression on a matter of public 
interest, and targeting a public official.137  The Court applied the principle that satire is a form 
of ‘artistic expression and social commentary’,138 and by its ‘inherent features of exaggeration 
and distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate’.139 Further, the expression at 
issue could not be ‘understood to address details’ of the politician’s private life, but rather his 
‘public standing as a politician’, and public officials must ‘display a wider tolerance in respect 
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of criticism’.140 Of course, it must be recognised that the Court takes a different approach to 
‘obscene’ expression relating to non-public officials,141 and religion.142  
But the expressive conduct in Mătăsaru was political expression targeting an elected 
official, and a number of public officials, in their official capacity, and on a matter of public 
interest. Indeed, on the public interest element, the Court has confirmed in other judgments 
concerning Moldova and anti-corruption policy, the ‘strong public interest’ on the issue of  
‘separation of powers’ and ‘improper conduct’ by high-ranking politicians and involving the 
Prosecutor General’s Office.143 In this regard, the Court has long held that there is ‘little scope’ 
for restrictions on expression on matters of public interest, and domestic authorities have a 
‘particularly narrow’ margin of appreciation.144  It must be remembered that Mătăsaru involved 
criminal proceedings for hooliganism, and not administrative proceedings, nor civil 
proceedings by the public officials targeted. This would be difficult to square with the Court’s 
principle that the ‘dominant position which those in power occupy’ makes it ‘necessary for 
them to display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings’, and only in ‘certain grave cases 
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- for instance in the case of speech inciting to violence’.145 There was no suggestion that the 
expressive conduct in Mătăsaru was anything other than entirely peaceful.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In 2003, something similar to Sinkova happened: a divided seven-judge Chamber of the Court, 
by four-votes-to-three, held in Cumpănă and Mazăre v Romania that suspended prison 
sentences imposed on two journalists for defamation were admittedly ‘harsh’, but as the 
journalists ‘did not serve their custodial sentences’,146 there had been no violation of Article 
10.  Unlike Sinkova, however, the Grand Chamber’s panel accepted a request for referral, and 
in a unanimous judgment, the 17-judge Grand Chamber set aside the Chamber judgment, and 
held in no uncertain terms, that a prison sentence, ‘by its very nature, will inevitably have a 
chilling effect’ on freedom of expression, and crucially, ‘the fact that the applicants did not 
serve their prison sentence does not alter that conclusion’.147 While the Grand Chamber has not 
stepped in to cure the aberration Sinkova arguably represented, this article has argued that the 
Court itself, at Chamber level, and through its subsequent case law, has been side-lining 
Sinkova.148 Indeed, in Mătăsaru, the Court applied the Grand Chamber’s chilling effect 
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principle from Cumpănă and Mazăre in finding that there was no justification whatsoever for 
the imposition of a suspended prison sentence. 149  
 Notably, where activists have been detained or imprisoned for engaging in ‘expressive 
conduct’ which was ‘peaceful and non-disruptive’, the Court is now applying the simplified 
procedure under Article 28 ECHR,150 with three-judge Committees ruling on both admissibility 
and merits of these cases at the same time, and near-automatically finding that detention or 
imprisonment for such expressive conduct violates Article 10.151 It is expected that the Court 
will continue to afford expressive conduct on matters of public interest the full protection of 
Article 10. It is up to the Court to continue to signal to national police forces, prosecutors, and 
courts, that restrictions on such protests are compatible with Article 10 only in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, and that peaceful demonstration should not, in principle, be made subject to 
the threat of a ‘penal sanction’.152 
 
 
 
                                                          
149
 Mătăsaru, supra n 6, [35].  
150
 Under Article 28(1)(b) ECHR, three-judge Committees may, by a unanimous vote, declare an application  
‘admissible and render at the same time a judgment on the merits, if the underlying question in the case, concerning 
the interpretation or the application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, is already the subject of well-
established case-law of the Court’) (emphasis added).  
151
 See, Muchnik and Mordovin v Russia (App nos 23814/15 and 2707/16) 12 February 2019, [45]; and also, 
Grigoryev and Igamberdiyeva v Russia (App no 10970/12) 12 February 2019; Belan and Sviderskaya v Russia 
(App nos 42294/13 and 42585/13) 12 February 2019; Nikolayev v Russia (App no 61443/13) 12 February 2019; 
and  Ryklin and Sharov v Russia (App nos 37513/15 and 37528/15) 12 February 2019.  
152
 Pekaslan and Others v Turkey (App nos 4572/06 and 5684/06) 20 March 2012, [81].  
